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Abstract. Does the debate between Rawlsians and liberal perfectionists boil down to the 
following: for liberal perfectionists, the government should fund aesthetic projects that are in 
good taste; for Rawlsians, the government should be neutral on the aesthetic value of anything? 
If so, liberal perfectionists are committed to the view that there is objective aesthetic value. In 
this paper, I argue that within the Rawlsian system is a thesis that is difficult to reconcile with 
objectivity about aesthetics. 
 
 What is the difference between Rawlsian liberalism and liberal perfectionism? Is there 
actually any difference?1 An impression one might have from examples discussed in the 
literature is that there is at least one significant difference: perfectionist liberals believe that the 
government should promote aesthetic projects that are in good taste, whereas Rawlsians believe 
that the government should be neutral on the aesthetic value of anything (e.g. Chan 2000: 14; 
Quong 2011: 62). 
 There is a brief way of disputing this impression. In the contemporary literature, a person 
qualifies as a liberal perfectionist if their beliefs about what the government should do are 
sufficient for them to count as a liberal and they also think that the government should spend 
some taxpayer money on trying to enable aesthetic or scientific or sporting achievements, 
because of the intrinsic value of such achievements.2 Thus it seems possible to be a liberal 
perfectionist and not care about aesthetic achievement at all, for example by only endorsing 
                                                             
1 A review of a book about the two political philosophies claims that Rawls’s philosophy and an influential form of 
liberal perfectionism threaten to collapse into one another (Simmons 2012: 1064). 
2 These are some ways of qualifying as a liberal perfectionist, but not necessarily the only ways. 
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perfectionist policies in relation to winning international sporting competitions. Such a person 
does not care if their national team wins by “ugly” means. They regard winning as of intrinsic 
value, but are indifferent to the means taken to victory. A liberal perfectionist, it seems, is not 
necessarily a liberal perfectionist aesthete. Unfortunately, the use of “perfectionist” in 
contemporary political philosophy can easily mislead. 
So far I have only questioned one side of the proposal for where the difference between 
Rawlsians and liberal perfectionists lies: that liberal perfectionists believe that the government 
should promote aesthetic projects that are in good taste. What about the other side – that 
Rawlsians believe that the government should be neutral on the aesthetic value of anything? 
Although they probably do indeed believe this, there is a feature of Rawls’s philosophy which 
does not look neutral at all. When we ask whether something has aesthetic value or not, this 
feature generates a pressure towards denying aesthetic value in most or all cases. But one has to 
engage in an elaborate analysis to uncover this feature. I present this analysis below. 
In A Theory of Justice. Rawls proposes certain principles that he believes a liberal society 
should implement. Here we need not go into exactly what these principles are. But let us ask, 
“How does he argue for his principles?” He relies on a method called reflective equilibrium 
(1999: 41). Put bluntly, his argument is as follows: “Premise 1: if the reflective equilibrium 
method supports my principles, then a liberal society should implement them. Premise 2: the 
reflective equilibrium method supports my principles. Therefore a liberal society should 
implement my principles.” 
 What is this reflective equilibrium method? Here is an initial statement of it. The method 
involves a person taking their moral judgments about specific situations, such as that it is wrong 
for the current government of the UK to allow all the gold in the country leave, and then trying to 
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develop a set of general principles that entails these judgments. If the proposed principles fail to 
entail most of these judgments, then one should reject these principles. But if they do entail most 
of them, then the option is available to reject the few judgments that do not fit with the 
principles. Rawls thinks that if readers carry out this method properly, they will arrive at the 
principles that he recommends. 
This initial statement does not quite capture Rawls’s version of the reflective equilibrium 
method. There are various qualifications one has to add, or other amendments one has to make, 
to capture it exactly. In this paper, my focus will be on one qualification.3 Rawls does not ask his 
readers to pay attention to all the moral judgments they make. Rather he asks them to pay 
attention to moral judgments made in certain states of mind – states of mind that are more likely 
to result in reliable judgments. (I shall describe these states of mind as more suitable for making 
judgments in.) Rawls writes: 
...we may discard those judgments made with hesitation, or in which we have 
little confidence. Similarly, those given when we are upset or frightened, or when 
we stand to gain in one way or the other can be left aside. All these judgments are 
likely to be erroneous or to be influenced by an excessive attention to our own 
interests. (1999: 42) 
Soon afterwards Rawls tells us: 
And once we regard the sense of justice as a mental capacity, as involving the 
exercise of thought, the relevant judgments are those given under conditions 
favourable for deliberation and judgment in general. (1999: 42) 
                                                             
3 A qualification that I shall not focus on is that Rawls allows more general moral judgments to enter the reflective 
equilibrium procedure (Tersman 2018: 10). 
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Here Rawls writes specifically about the sense of justice, because it is moral judgments about 
justice that he is interested in. But, as the rest of the quotation indicates, for Rawls it does not 
matter whether one is making a judgment about a scientific topic or an aesthetic topic or a moral 
topic, or any other kind of topic. There are some states of mind that are more suitable for making 
judgments in and others that are less suitable, and it is the same states that are more suitable, 
whatever the topic. 
 This general thesis leads Rawls to ignore what goes on in some states of mind when using 
the reflective equilibrium method, so it has an important role to play in justifying his version of 
that method. But Rawls does not argue for the general thesis. He simply asserts it. The thesis is 
not self-evident, so he needs an argument. 
Furthermore, there is a challenge to it. Being frightened is usually not a good condition 
for forming reliable judgments about something, but consider the following situation. It is night 
and some children are telling ghost stories, while camping. Afterwards, one child says that 
ghosts are not frightening. Then someone comes along and makes a ghost-like sound outside 
their tent. The children believe it is a ghost and are frightened. At this point, they are disposed to 
judge that ghosts are frightening. The earlier judgment that ghosts are not frightening is 
undermined, even though it was made when they were not frightened. 
Let us turn from this example to a theory. The theory is composed of two claims. (a) 
Some things really are frightening. (b) If a person does not suffer from phobias or other 
psychological disorders, is not under the influence of any drug and is frightened by a certain 
thing, then it is likely that this thing really is frightening. The theory presented entails that being 
in a frightened state is good for finding out that something is frightening, given the appropriate 
T.R. Edward 
5 
 
psychological background.4 In which case, this state of mind is suitable for making some 
judgments, contrary to Rawls’s view. Being frightened is good for judging that something is 
frightening! How might Rawlsians respond to this theory? They could accept (a) but deny (b). 
But this combination is hard, if not impossible, to justify. Alternatively, they could deny (a) and 
say that nothing is actually frightening. It is just that one has a reaction of fright and erroneously 
attributes the quality of being frightening to whatever caused the reaction. It is easier to defend 
Rawls’s general thesis by offering this response, but Rawlsian reflective equilibrium is not meant 
to be a method that is only available to subjectivists5 about the frightening. 
 Perhaps being frightening is not an aesthetic property, but similar points could be raised 
about uncontroversial cases of aesthetic properties, such as being poetic. If something is poetic, 
the best state of mind for detecting this does not seem to be the kind of state which is best for 
judging that the round-earth theory is better than the flat-earth theory. It would seem to be a state 
of poetic enchantment caused by the poetic thing. 
Here is a summary of my analysis. Rawls argues for his liberal principles by saying that 
his reflective equilibrium method supports them. His method involves taking moral judgments 
from some states of mind only and trying to develop a set of principles which entails those 
judgments. When we ask why he ignores judgments made in other states of mind, his answer is a 
general thesis: there are some states of mind that are more suitable for making judgments in, 
whatever the topic, and some which are less suitable, and the ignored judgments are those made 
in less suitable states. But Rawls does not argue for the general thesis. This would not be a 
problem if the thesis were self-evident, but actually it is very controversial. One area in which it 
                                                             
4 It may be that some other conditions must be included to properly capture the appropriate psychological 
background. I proceed on the assumption that (b) fully captures the conditions. 
5 To be a subjectivist about the frightening, as I am using the term, is to deny that there are frightening things. 
Anyone who holds that there are frightening things is an objectivist, even if they understand the quality of being 
frightening in a way that makes references to mental states (see McDowell 1985: 113-114). 
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is very controversial is aesthetics. The thesis is far easier to reconcile with subjectivism about 
aesthetic qualities than objectivism, when Rawls is supposed to be neutral on the debate between 
subjectivists and objectivists – his conclusions and methods are supposed to be equally available 
to citizens who hold different views on this debate. So if a neutral Rawls is to justify his version 
of reflective equilibrium, he needs a justification which does not involve this general thesis. 
Although the policies of liberal perfectionist aesthetes may be very similar to Rawlsian 
policies, they are likely to reject his argument if they are aware that it depends on the general 
thesis I have identified and aware of the implications of this thesis for aesthetics. Can Rawlsians 
not just switch to a more restricted thesis that concerns morality alone? A justification for the 
more restricted thesis is required that does not derive it from the general thesis and at present it is 
unclear what that justification is. At present, we should be open to the possibility that states of 
mind which Rawls ignores, such as being angry or upset or even intoxicated,6 are sometimes of 
value for making moral judgments. 
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